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Environmental Law-IMPACT STATEMENTS-AGENCY MAY BE 
REQUIRED TO FILE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE- 
MENT WHEN COMTEMPLATING RE IONAL CONTROL OF RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT-Sierra Club u. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), cert. granted sub nom. Kleppe u. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 772 
(1976). 
The Northern Great Plains Province1 contains one of the 
largest untapped coal reserves in the United States. For several 
reasons, the coal in this province is a desirable resource for satis- 
fying short-term national energy needs. Most of this coal is lo- 
cated on public land under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the 
Interior. 
On June 13, 1973, the Sierra Club and several other environ- 
mental groups filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and the 
Army.l Plaintiffs claimed that these federal agencies were violat- 
ing the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA)3 by controlling coal development in an area defined 
by plaintiffs as the "Northern Great Plains Region,"' without 
first carefully considering interdisciplinary studies of the area 
and preparing a regional environmental impact statement. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the govern- 
ment, concluding that the region as defined by plaintiffs had 
never been designated for federal development by statute or exec- 
utive action, and that a regional federal action within the mean- 
ing of NEPA did not exist and had never been propo~ed.~ The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit6 reversed the district court and enjoined the Department of 
1. The Northern Great Plains Province covers portions of North Dakota, South Da- 
kota, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. 
2. 514 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Later in the proceedings, the court allowed 
several parties to intervene as defendants: a tribe of Indians, an individual rancher, eight 
electric public utilities, three natural gas companies, and four coal mining companies. All 
intervening defendants have interests in the coal development on the Northern Great 
Plains. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § §  4321 et seq. (1970). 
4. The region defined by the complaint encompasses north-eastern Wyoming, eastern 
Montana, and the western Dakotas. Brief for Intervening Appellees at  4, Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This area is somewhat different than that deline- 
ated by the government as the Northern Great Plains Province. See note 1 supra; 514 F.2d 
at  881 n.33. 
5. The district court's opinion remains unreported. 
6. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit Judges Wright and 
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the Interior from approving certain mining plans and railroad 
rights-of-way, all of which were covered by the Eastern Powder 
River Coal Basin Environmental Impact Statement.' Specifi- 
cally, the court held that "a comprehensive major federal action 
is contemplated in the Northern Great Plains? But, being un- 
certain about the ripeness of the "contemplated" action, the 
court remanded the case with instructions that the federal appel- 
lees decide whether to prepare a regional impact statement. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and stayed the 
injunction pending a decision on the merits. 
A. The Department of the Interior's Coal Leasing Policy 
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920' vests in the Secre- 
tary of the Interior the major initiative for and control of the 
development of all federally owned coal. In particular, the Act 
grants the Secretary discretionary authority to lease to private 
parties coal extraction and development rights.l0 Early in 1973, 
the Secretary of the Interior instigated development of a long- 
term plan to establish a national coal leasing policy. As part of 
the development of this plan, the Department began preparation 
of an  impact statement to measure the environmental effects of 
all federal coal leasing." Pending issuance of this impact state- 
ment, the Secretary announced that the Department of the Inte- 
MacKinnon. Judge Wright authored the opinion of the court. Judge MacKinnon dissented 
in an extensive opinion. 
7. 514 F.2d at 868, 883. 
8. Id. a t  878. 
9. 30 U.S.C. § §  201-08 (1970). 
10. Id. 6 201. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act limits disposition of federal coal depos- 
its to leasing (administered by the Bureau of Land Management), eliminating the pre- 
vious government practice of selling mineral lands. 514 F.2d at  863 n.5. 
On January 26, 1976, the Department of the Interior announced a new coal leasing 
policy that adopts the final proposals of the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation 
System. Under this policy, all leasing will be conducted on a competitive basis. The 
Secretary will require the Bureau of Land Management to prepare "regional" impact 
statements when such factors as "basin boundaries, drainage areas, [and] areas of eco- 
nomic interdependence" make such a statement necessary. Department of the Interior 
Press Release (Jan. 26, 1976). 
11. 514 F.2d at 863. The final version of this impact statement was issued in Septem- 
ber, 1975. It  analyzes the impact of coal leasing to be conducted under the Energy Miner- 
als Activity Recommendation System. The statement covers "some 85 million acres of 
identified coal reserves located primarily in the Northern Great Plains and northward 
along the Continental Divide from New Mexico and Arizona through Montana." 40 Fed. 
Reg. 43239 (1975). 
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rior would issue coal leases only to meet the short-term needs of 
existing mines. l2 
Under the short-term leasing policy, the Department of the 
Interior approved four mining plans in Wyoming and Montana 
and received requests to approve another four in the same area.13 
The government filed impact statements dealing with most of 
these plans." One cumulative impact statement was prepared for 
the four plans situated in Wyoming's Eastern Powder River 
Basin. l5 
Subsequently, the Secretary decided to further restrict coal- 
related activities on the Northern Great Plains until completion 
of the Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP).16 It 
is unclear whether this program is actually a federal effort to 
produce a regional development plan or merely a research project 
designed to provide a framework for environmental decision- 
making.17 It is certain that the NGPRP is not equivalent to an 
12. 514 F.2d at  863. The announcement stated that coal leases would be issued only 
under the following conditions: 
(a) When coal is needed now to maintain an existing mining operation; or 
(b) When coal is needed as a reserve for production in the near future; and 
(c) When the land to be mined will in all cases be reclaimed in accordance with 
lease stipulations that will provide for environmental protection and land recla- 
mation; and 
(d) When an environmental impact statement covering the proposed lease has 
been prepared when required under the National Environmental Policy Act. 
Id. at 865-66. In answer to supplemental interrogatories ordered by the appellate court in 
the present case, the Department of the Interior announced that it is not now offering any 
further leases in the province under the short-term leasing program. Id. a t  866. 
13. 514 F.2d at  865 nn.13, 14. 
14. Id. at  865 n.15. An impact statement filed for one of these plans was sustained 
as adequate in Redding v. Morton, Civil No. 74-12-BLG (D. Mont., May 1, 1974). The 
statement covered 770 acres of the 30,876 acre tract leased to Westmoreland Resources 
by the Crow Indians. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit enjoined any further mining activity 
on the leased land outside the 770 acres until a comprehensive statement covering the 
remaining 30,000 acres had been prepared. Cady v. Morton, Civil No. 74-1984 (9th Cir., 
June 19, 1975). 
15. 514 F.2d at  865 n.15. 
16. The affidavit of Secretary Morton stated: 
[Tlhe granting or approval of leases, special use permits and all types of rights- 
of-way across public lands, the delivery and sale of water and approval of mining 
plans . . . will be held in abeyance . . . or submitted to the Under Secretary 
for review and concurrence prior to execution. 
514 F.2d at 864. 
17. The district court termed the NGPRP "a study project and not a program for 
development." Id. a t  867. Judge Wright referred to it  variously as: "[Tlhe Government's 
attempt to formulate a regional program that will enable i t  to control development," id. 
at 876, and "a massive . . . study . . . to assess . . . impacts that development of the 
Province would cause." Id. at 863. He assumes that the proposal for regional federal action 
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impact statement as that term is used in NEPA.18 
B. Statutory Requirements-Judicial Interpretations 
Congress enacted NEPA to insure that federal agency plan- 
ning and decision-making will include the proper consideration of 
environmental  value^.^ To achieve effective implementation, 
Congress wrote certain "action-forcing" provisions into section 
102 of the Act.20 Of these provisions, the one in section 102(2)(C) 
has become the enforcement tool most frequently used by the 
courts.21 That section requires federal agencies to prepare envi- 
ronmental impact statements on all "major federal actions signif- 
icantly affecting the quality of the human en~ironment ."~~ 
Judicial interpretations of NEPA's impact statement re- 
quirements have been numerous and diverse due to undefined 
language in key sections of the Act. Indeed, the Act's ambiguity 
causes two particularly difficult problems faced by the court in 
the instant case. First, since the Act does not define "major fed- 
eral actions," it is not clear whether related "major federal ac- 
tions" must be treated jointly by a single impact statement? 
Second, since the statute does not specify, i t  is unclear a t  what 
point in an agency's decision-making process an impact state- 
ment must be prepared. 
1. Measuring the scope of "major federal actions" 
Because NEPA does not define "major federal actions," en- 
will be contained in the final NGPRP report. Id. a t  882. In dissent, Judge MacKinnon 
says, "the Study was never intended to produce a comprehensive regional plan for coal 
development," and cites the Draft Interim Report as stating that "[tlhe primary objec- 
tive of the [NGPRP] is to provide information and a comprehensive analysis that can 
be used to place the potential impacts of coal development into perspective and thereby 
assist . . . in the management of the natural and human resources of this region." Id. at 
892. 
18. 514 F.2d a t  877-78, 892. 
19. See S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
20. 42 U.S.C. 5 4332. For legislative history concerning the necessity of the "action- 
forcing" provisions see S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 19 (1969). 
21. See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMEN- 
TAL LAW 239 (1974). 
22. 42 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
23. Only one Supreme Court opinion discusses NEPA's requirements concerning the 
proper scope of "major federal actions." Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challeng- 
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCRAP]. 
The context of the SCRAP opinion, however, distinguishes it from the present case. 
SCRAP dealt with specific delineations of discretionary power to the ICC and a highly 
structured ICC hearing procedure. In contrast, the present case involves the less struc- 
tured procedure of the Department of the Interior. 
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vironmental groups frequently challenge the geographic bounda- 
ries that agencies have designated for their actions. In a typical 
case, the government files an impact statement on a particular 
project; environmentalists then claim that the statement should 
have covered all similar federal projects in the entire region.24 
Although the courts have had to develop their own tests for deter- 
mining whether to require regional impact statements in such 
cases, the central inquiry in each judicial decision appears to be 
the same: How interrelated or interdependent are the individual 
actions? To determine the degree of interdependency among fed- 
eral actions, the courts examine the effect that the individual 
projects have on each other. For example, if construction of one 
facility will require, in order to make that facility useful, federal 
construction of additional facilities, the courts view the first con- 
struction project as an increment of a larger action requiring a 
comprehensive environmental analysis.25 
In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AECZ6 
(SIPI), the District of Columbia Circuit held that a comprehen- 
sive impact statement was necessary to assess the cumulative 
impact of the Atomic Energy Commission's entire Liquid Metal 
Fast Breeder Reactor Program even though separate statements 
had been prepared for the program's anticipated initial test facil- 
ity and demonstration plant.27 The court determined that the test 
facility and demonstration plant would have no significance as 
independent energy sources absent the entire fast-breeder reactor 
program. Indeed, anticipated construction of those facilities rep- 
resented merely initial increments of the total time, money, and 
research invested to achieve breeder reactor feasibility. Such ini- 
tial investments were likely to foreclose consideration of alterna- 
tive energy sources and make the commercial marketing of fast- 
breeder reactors the nation's top priority energy program. For this 
reason, the court determined that NEPA required more than 
piecemeal consideration of the impact of separate facilities." 
24. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. 
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 
1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973). 
25. See Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transporta- 
tion, 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 
1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973). 
26. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
27. Id. a t  1082. For a more detailed explanation of the analysis and holding of SIPI 
see 87 HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1974). 
28. See 481 F.2d a t  1082, 1089-90, 1096-98. 
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Similarly, in Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. 
v. Secretary of T r a n s p o r t a t i ~ n , ~ ~  the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that improvement of a 21-mile segment of U.S. 
Route 7 in Vermont could not proceed until the government pre- 
pared an impact statement covering the entire three-state 280- 
mile ~orridor.~" Although no comprehensive corridor development 
plan existed, the court relied on findings that the federal defen- 
dants had a goal of converting Route 7 into a superhighway, a goal 
"possible of accomplishment with legislative and Federal ap- 
proval over a long-range period of time."31 The court based its 
decision on factors very similar to those in SIPI. For instance, the 
court stated that the early commitment of federal funds to the 
project would eliminate any consideration of alternatives to de- 
velopment and that the improvement of separate segments along 
the corridor would create a "synergistic pressure" to complete 
widening along the entire route.32 
By way of contrast, in Sierra Club v. S t a n ~ r n ~ ~  and Trout 
Unlimited u. Morton,34 the courts upheld the autonomy of indi- 
vidual actions challenged as being interdependent." In Stamm, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Strawberry 
Aqueduct and Collection System was an independent major fed- 
eral action, not merely an increment of the Central Utah Project. 
Thus, no comprehensive impact statement was required.36 The 
court based its holding on two findings: (1) the aqueduct and 
collection system could achieve its designed purpose whether or 
not any other components of the Central Utah Project were con- 
structed, and (2) the impact of the system would not vary accord- 
ing to future actions taken by the go~ernrnent.~' In contrast to the 
dependent nature of the individual breeder reactor in SIPI, the 
29. 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
30. Id. a t  933-36. 
31. Id. a t  929. 
32. Id. a t  929-30. 
33. 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974). 
34. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
35. The Stamm court relied in part on Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 
356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973). In Armstrong, the district 
court explained the rationale behind the "independent major federal action" interpreta- 
tion of NEPA. 
So long as each major federal action is undertaken individually and not as an 
indivisable, integral part of an integrated . . . system, then the requirements 
of NEPA are determined on an individual major federal action basis. 
356 F. Supp. at 139. 
36. 507 F.2d a t  792-93. 
37. Id. a t  791. 
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Strawberry system had significance absent the larger regional 
project. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trout Unlimited 
found the first phase of the Teton Dam and Reservoir Project to 
be "substantially independent of the second," obviating the need 
for a comprehensive impact statement." The court emphasized 
that the utility of the first phase did not depend in any way upon 
construction of the second. Rather, second phase construction 
was contingent upon a separate feasibility study that would take 
into account the commitment of resources to the first phase. In 
light of these findings, the court distinguished SIPrs fast-breeder 
program as having stages sufficiently indivisible that it would be 
"irrational" to commence "the first stage if subsequent phases 
were not also ~nde r t aken , "~~  
2. Timing the impact statement 
The courts have looked to two phrases of NEPA section 102 
in determining the proper timing for impact statement prepara- 
tion. One phrase requires government agencies to "include in 
every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . major fed- 
eral actions . . . a detailed" impact statement. A second phrase 
provides that the statement "shall accompany the proposal 
through the existing agency review proces~es."~~ In addition to the 
wording of NEPA, some courts have relied on guidelines for im- 
pact statement preparation prepared by the Council on Environ- 
mental Quality (CEQ) and published soon after NEPA took ef- 
fect." The CEQ guidelines call for the preparation and circulation 
of draft impact statements "as early as possible in the agency 
review process in order to permit agency decision-makers and 
outside reviewers" to meaningfully assess the impact of the pro- 
posed action." The CEQ guidelines further provide that no deter- 
38. 509 F.2d a t  1284-85. 
39. Id. a t  1285 & n.13. 
40. 42 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
41. For a thorough history and discussion of the CEQ guidelines see Note, The Coun- 
cil on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National Environ- 
mental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 547 (1974). Various courts do not give the CEQ 
guidelines equal weight. Some courts use the guidelines as merely advisory. E.g., Hiram 
Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973). Others give them great 
deference. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps. of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 
728, 744 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
42. 40 C.F.R. 8 1500.7(a) (1974). 
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minative agency action on a proposal is to be taken before a final 
statement is 
In the instant case, the federal government denied being en- 
gaged in any Northern Great Plains regional coal development 
program. I t  therefore argued that no regional "major federal ac- 
tion" existed and, consequently, that NEPA required no compre- 
hensive impact statement." In rebuttal, the environmentalists 
argued that comprehensive federal planning is necessary for ade- 
quate management of the nation's resources. Since the govern- 
ment had no plan for regional coal development, i t  must file a 
comprehensive impact statement before taking further action. 
The court determined that the federal government, despite 
the absence of a formal development plan, contemplated a major 
federal action that would require preparation of a comprehensive 
impact statement. The Department of the Interior's study of the 
possibilities for resource development in the area,45 the Depart- 
ment's recognition of the necessity for coordinated regional devel- 
opment, and the purposes of the ongoing NGPRP46 all constituted 
-- -- - - 
43. Id..$ 1500.11(b). 
44. 514 F.2d at 872-73. Additionally, the intervening appellees (note 2 supra) made 
arguments concerning the case's justiciability and the environmentalists' standing. On the 
issue of justiciability, intervening appellees argued: (1) Since the environmentalists did 
not challenge specific past government actions, or present evidence of ripeness of alleged 
future actions on the Northern Great Plains, the constitutional case or controversy re- 
quirement was not satisfied; and (2) Since the agency had not taken final action on the 
project, judicial review was not available. See Brief for Intervening Appellees a t  32-34, 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The appellate court found the case 
to be justiciable, stating that the environmentalists' allegations demonstrated that gov- 
ernment actions to control Northern Great Plains coal development were sufficient to 
state a case or controversy. 514 F.2d at 868 n.20. 
The district court did not reach the issue of the environmentalists' standing. On 
appeal, the intervening appellees argued that since the environmentalists had failed to 
show how any member of their organizations would be harmed by the challenged govern- 
ment activity, the district court properly denied Sierra Club's petition for injunctive relief. 
Brief for Intervening Appellees a t  42, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
The appellate court acknowledged that standing "can be deemed to have been proved" 
by only one appellant, Northern Plains Resource Council, and suggested that on remand 
the environmentalists should be allowed to introduce evidence of their standing to enable 
the district court to rule on the issue. 514 F.2d at 868-70. 
45. The NGPRP is the most recent of three studies initiated by the Department of 
the Interior to study aspects of industrial development related to coal production on the 
Northern Great Plains. The first two studies, the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study 
and the North Central Power Study, were suspended before completion. 514 F.2d at  863, 
875-76. 
46. Id. a t  875-78. 
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evidence that the government contemplated control of regional 
coal development. Nevertheless, the court was uncertain whether 
the federal action had ripened sufficiently to require immediate 
preparation of an impact statement. It therefore remanded the 
case and instructed the district court to allow the government to 
decide whether the time was appropriate to file an impact state- 
ment." The court also approved, in theory, the legal basis for the 
environmentalists' argument that NEPA imposes on the federal 
government an affirmative duty to comprehensively plan.48 
In dissent, Judge MacKinnon stated that since the court did 
not require the government to file an impact statement, the only 
"practical effect'' of the majority's decision was "to continue the 
temporary injunction."" He disagreed with such a continuation 
since the activities enjoined were already covered by impact 
statements whose sufficiency had not been ~hal lenged.~~ The en- 
vironmentalists' suit was inappropriate because it was "divorced 
from the review of a statement covering an individual project." 
In permitting the suit, the majority improperly relied on the SIPI 
holding that a challenge to a comprehensive program does not 
have to be made through an attack on an individual project.51 In 
the instant case, no comprehensive impact statement was neces- 
sary because the record showed no regional program or compre- 
hensive commitment of resources similar to those found in SIPL5* 
The instant case raises three significant issues: (1) Does the 
scope of the "major federal actions" provision of section 102(2) (C) 
of NEPA mandate a regional impact statement covering the gov- 
ernment's coal development activities on the Northern Great 
Plains? (2) What standard should be applied to determine when 
the federal government must file an impact statement? (3) Does 
NEPA impose on the government an affirmative duty to compre- 
hensively plan? 
A. The Scope of "Major Federal Actions" 
In determining whether the government's coal development 
- - 
47. Id. at 881-82. 
48. Id. at 873-74. 
49. Id. at 884. 
50. Id. at 892-93. See text accompanying note 7 supra. 
51. Id. at 868-70 n.20. 
52. Id. at 884, 888. 
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activities on the Northern Great Plains constituted a comprehen- 
sive major federal action requiring a regional impact statement, 
the court followed the SIPI and Conservation Society casesU and 
distinguished a line of contrary decisions, including the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Trout Unlimited and the Tenth Circuit's 
decision in Stamm.54 Nevertheless, the court failed to adequately 
demonstrate that the Department of the Interior's actions on the 
Northern Great Plains were more closely analogous to the facts 
of the SIPI and Conservation Society cases than to the facts liti- 
gated in S tamm and Trout Unlimited? A comparison of the 
present case to SIPI and Conservation Society reveals significant 
factual differences that undermine the court's reliance on the 
rationale of those cases. 
The court attempted to bring the present case within the 
reasoning of SIP1 and Conservation Society in two ways. First, 
the court determined that the government had treated its at- 
tempts a t  regional control of coal development in such a way as 
to require a comprehensive impact statement." The nature of the 
regional activity in the present case, however, differs markedly 
from the federal activities considered in SIPI and Conservation 
Society. The AEC in SIPI published a ten-volume program giving 
the agency's specific goals and projected time-tables for their 
acc~mpl ishment .~~ Also, the federal plan in Conservation Society 
was sufficiently certain to enable the court to determine the exact 
length of the Route 7 corridor as well as the location of the seg- 
mented improvement projects in various stages of const ru~t ion.~~ 
53. Id. at 871-78; see notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted 
that soon after the present case was decided, the United States Supreme Court, in a 
summary action, vacated the Second Circuit's Conservation Society decision and re- 
manded the case "for further consideration in light of' SCRAP. Coleman v. Conservation 
Society of Southern Vermont, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975). Since no opinion appeared, it is 
unclear whether the Court considered the comprehensive impact statement requirement 
of the case to be improper. But the Court's action may draw into question the validity of 
the Conservation Society holding as precedent for the present decision. 
54. 514 F.2d at 878 n.29; see notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra. 
55. The court distinguished S tamm and Trout Unlimited because those cases did not 
involve "a direct challenge to the need for a regional" impact statement. 514 F.2d at 878 
n.29. The dissent sharply criticized the majority for making this technical distinction. 
Judge MacKinnon argued that it is unreasonable to disregard such cases as S tamm and 
Dout Unlimited merely because they indirectly assessed the need for a regional impact 
statement by way of determining the sufficiency of a challenged individual statement. 514 
F.2d at 889. 
56. 514 F.2d at 875. 
57. 481 F.2d at 1083-84. The AEC had forecast that approximately 500 fast-breeder 
power plants would be built by the turn of the century and another 700 "in the first decade 
of the 21st century." Id. at 1084-85 n.18. 
58. See 508 F.2d at 934 & 936 n.43a. 
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In contrast, the regional plan for Great Plains development is 
tentative and ill-defined. In fact, the court admitted that the 
government's exact role in Northern Great Plains development 
and the specific geographical area to be affected were uncertain.5g 
Second, the court suggested that resources were about to be 
irretrievably committed to the government's Great Plains devel- 
opment program.60 To prevent such commitment, the court tem- 
porarily enjoined further mining activity in the Powder River 
Basin. Specifically in response to the dissent's contention that 
the instant case lacked evidence of a synergistic commitment of 
resources, a consideration crucial to the reasoning of SIPI and 
Conservation Society, the court suggested that pressure for fur- 
ther development would result from the influx of manpower 
drawn to the area and that provision of water for one mining 
operation could irretrievably commit that area's water supply to 
the exclusion of any future mines." Although these allegations, 
if proven, would justify the majority's reliance on SIPI and 
Conservation Society, the court's predictions of a regional com- 
mitment of resources are simply not substantiated. Further, the 
court failed to point to any evidence showing that existing impact 
statements had inadequately treated these possibilities. In short, 
the court based its reliance on SIPI and Conservation Society on 
an unproven factual premise, a premise that the court itself cre- 
ated out of whole cloth. 
The court should have refused to enjoin work on the individ- 
ual projects in the Powder River Basin until challengers proved 
that the impact statement covering that area was inadeq~ate. '~ 
59. Id. a t  881. 
60. See 514 F.2d at  864-66, 881, 883. 
61. Id. a t  877 n.28. 
62. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The recent case of Cady v. Morton, Civil 
No. 74-1984 (9th Cir., June 19, 1975), decided three days after the court's decision in the 
instant case, is instructive on this point. Appellants challenged the sufficiency of a De- 
partment of the Interior impact statement filed on a 770-acre mining plan because it failed 
to comprehensively consider the other 30,106 acres of land included in the original coal 
lease. The court held that NEPA required preparation of a comprehensive statement 
covering the 30,106 acres, and enjoined mining activity on that portion pending comple- 
tion of the statement; development of the 770 acres included in the original statement was 
permitted because the court found that the statement filed for that portion sufficiently 
treated the environmental impact. 
Applied to the instant case, Cady suggests that the court would be justified in enjoin- 
ing any mining activity outside the areas presently covered by impact statements if it 
determined that a regional statement was necessary; but it  could not properly enjoin 
mining covered by the Powder River Basin impact statement unless that statement was 
proven to be insufficient. 
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B. A Standard for Determining the Timing of Impact 
Statements 
The court determined that a comprehensive major federal 
action in the Northern Great Plains was contemplated but did 
not require a regional impact statement since the federal govern- 
ment had not yet defined its role in development of the region.63 
In other words, the government's actions had not "ripened" to the 
point where an impact statement was mandated. The court as- 
sumed that the government would define its role in an NGPRP 
interim report and ordered it to decide within 30 days of issuance 
of the report whether it would prepare an impact statement. An 
analysis of NEPA's language and the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. u. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency  procedure^^^ (SCRAP), however, reveal that 
the court misconstrued NEPA's timing requirement for the prep- 
aration of an impact statement. 
In interpreting NEPA's timing language in SCRAP, the Su- 
preme Court held that section 102's requirement that the impact 
statement "shall accompany the proposal through the existing 
agency review processes" does not indicate the proper timing for 
statement preparation but merely provides that once the impact 
statement is prepared it must accompany the proposal.65 Another 
statutory requirement-that agencies include an impact state- 
ment "in every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . 
major federal actions"-represents NEPA's timing requirement 
for impact statement preparation. "Under this sentence of the 
statute [the sentence quoted immediately above], the time a t  
which an agency must prepare the final 'statement' is the time 
at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for 
federal action? NEPA's language must refer only to preparation 
of the final impact statement, "for no other kind of statement is 
mentioned in the statute?' 
The three-judge district court in SCRAP had held that an 
oral hearing conducted by the ICC to consider the railroads' peti- 
tion for a rate increase was an "agency review process" a t  which 
a final impact statement should have been issued.68 The Supreme 
63. 514 F.2d at 880-82. 
64. 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (decided June 24, 1975, one week after the court's decision in 
the instant case). 
65. Id. at  320. 
66. Id. (emphasis in original). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 319-20. 
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Court reversed and pointed out that prior to the issuance of the 
ICC report on the applicant's proposed general rate increase (the 
report was issued after the oral hearing) no federal "proposal, 
recommendation or report" had been made; rather, only a private 
proposal for new rates had been submitted by the railroads? 
NEPA, therefore, did not require the ICC to file an impact state- 
ment any earlier than the date of issuance of its report. 
In the present case, if any proposals for regional development 
exist, they are private proposals in the nature of applications for 
rights-of-way, lease issuance, and mining plan approval. Indeed, 
the court tacitly conceded that  no federal proposal had been 
made when it presumed that such a proposal "would be embodied 
in the [as yet unprepared] final NGPRP report." The court, 
nevertheless, required the government to decide whether to pre- 
pare an impact statement within 30 days after the Department 
of the Interior issued the NGPRP interim reporta70 This order was 
based on the court's notion that NEPA requires a statement to 
"precede the 'recommendation or report on proposals' "71 in order 
to "aid agency planning and decision-making before the final 
recommended proposal for action is made."72 
In light of SCRAP, the court was wrong in interpreting 
NEPA to require that an impact statement precede the recorn- 
mendation or report on proposals for major federal actions. The 
statute does not require final impact statements to be available 
at any time before the agency issues a report on the proposal.73 
Although the court's statement is not consistent with CEQ in- 
structions respecting draft impact  statement^,'^ those instruc- 
tions do not constitute mandatory requirements; rather, they are 
69. Id. a t  320. 
70. 514 F.2d a t  882. 
71. Id. a t  879. To support this notion, Judge Wright cites his opinion in Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which states that 
NEPA requires "environmental issues [to] be considered a t  every important stage in the 
decision making process." The Supreme Court in SCRAP, however, recently decided that 
"[tlo the extent to which Calvert Cliffs' . . . read[s] the requirement that the statement 
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes differently" [than 
the SCRAP interpretation, it] "would appear to conflict with the statute." 422 U.S. a t  
321 n.20. Thus, Judge Wright appears to be unjustified in relying upon the Calvert Cliffs' 
statement. 
72. 514 F.2d a t  881-82 n.35. 
73. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra. 
74. See text accompanying note 42 supra. The Supreme Court in SCRAP strength- 
ened the significance to NEPA of the CEQ instructions respecting draft .statements by 
noting that the ICC had procedurally complied with NEPA by making draft statements 
available to the public prior to the hearings on the rate increases. 422 U.S. a t  321. 
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subject to agency prer~gative.'~ Therefore, the judiciary can do no 
more than encourage agency compliance with the letter and spirit 
of the CEQ guidelines; it cannot require, as the court did in the 
present case, the federal government to submit draft statements. 
C. NEPA and Mandatory Federal Planning 
The district court in the instant case held that NEPA section 
102(2)(A) does not require the government to engage in regional 
planning and that, because no Great Plains regional plan for coal 
development existed, no impact statement was necessary.76 On 
appeal, the environmentalists argued that the duty to prepare a 
regional impact statement should be imposed on the government 
even though no regional plan had been created.77 Appellants con- 
tended that the district court erred in interpreting NEPA to 
demand of the government no more environmental planning than 
the government chooses to do. Such an interpretation, they 
argued, would allow an agency to avoid NEPA's requirements 
simply by resolving not to construct a regional plan.78 
In dictum, the circuit court expressed a favorable attitude 
toward the environmentalists' legal arguments on this point,79 
and thereby, as the dissent pointed out, "laid the groundwork for 
the perpetuation of this . . . position in future cases."80 The court 
cited three sources of authority to support the legality. of 
appellants' argument: the CEQ guidelines, dictum from Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. u. Morton,81 and the policy lan- 
guage of NEPA section 101.82 Analysis of these authorities reveals 
fundamental weaknesses in the court's position. 
75. The interim guidelines, published by the CEQ shortly after NEPA took effect, 
introduced the concept of optional draft impact statements. The purpose of this procedure 
was to help agencies receive feedback on their proposals from concerned sources. Such 
comments were to accompany the final statements through the review process. Note, The 
Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 547, 554 (1974). 
76. Sierra Club v. Morton, No. 1182-73 (D.D.C., Feb. 14, 1974), Conclusions of Law 
5 & 6 (reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari a t  98A-99A, petition for cert. filed sub 
nom. Frizzell v. Sierra Club, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975) (No. 552)). 
77. See Brief for Appellants a t  47-58, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 
19%). 
78. Id. a t  52. 
79. The court stated that it  "approve[d], in theory, the legal basis for appellant's 
argument." It noted, however, the "practical difficulties" of actually implementing the 
idea, such as intrusion "on agency discretion while overly involving the courts in the day- 
to-day business of running the government." 514 F.2d a t  874-75. 
80. Id. a t  892. 
81. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
82. 514 F.2d at  873-75. 
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1. The legal basis for mandatory planning 
a. CEQ guidelines. It is unclear what language of the CEQ 
guidelines the court interprets as supporting the notion of im- 
posed planning since no specific citation appears in the opinion 
and no language in the guidelines explicitly requires such a prac- 
tice. If, however, the notion is clear from the general focus of the 
guidelines, the proper weight to be given the CEQ-created re- 
quirement remains an unsettled question. The court indicates 
that the CEQ guidelines are "entitled to great respect,"83 but 
concedes that the cases it cites for this proposition concerned 
instances where the agency interpreting the statute was charged 
with its admini~tration.~~ In contrast, CEQ has no statutory au- 
thority to enforce NEPA  provision^:^^ it acts in an advisory capac- 
ity with respect to the executive branch and depends upon agency 
cooperation for its effectivenes~.~~ At the very least, therefore, the 
deference given the CEQ guidelines by the court in the present 
case appears both excessive and unwarranted. 
b. Dictum from Natural Resources Defense Council. As 
additional support for its position, the court citess7 the following 
from Natural Resources Defense Council: 
What NEPA infused into the decision-making process in 1969 
was a directive as to environmental impact statements that was 
meant to implement the Congressional objectives of Govern- 
ment coordination, [and] a comprehensive approach to envi- 
ronmental management, . . . [and thus avoid] environmental 
decision-making wherein "policy is established by default and 
inaction" . . . . 88 
The court admits that it reads this dictum broadly to mean that 
under NEPA, comprehensive planning may be imposed on an 
agency that is unwilling to take the initiati~e.~' This broad read- 
ing is questionable, however, since the quoted language is pre- 
faced and limited by the phrase, "as to environmental impact 
statements." In essence, the quote indicates that by requiring 
83. Id. at 873-74 & n.24. 
84. Id. at 873-74 n.24. 
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341 et seq. (1970); 514 F.2d at 873-74 n.24. 
86. See 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL L W 4 9.01(b) (1975); Note, The 
Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 547 (1974). 
87. 514 F.2d at 874. 
88. 458 F.2d at 836 (emphasis added). 
89. 514 F.2d at 874. 
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impact statements for major federal actions, NEPA dictates how 
the planning of a federal action should be conducted-in an inter- 
disciplinary fashion in which agencies consider the environmental 
effects of their programs through the medium of impact state- 
ment~.~VI'he quote cannot be properly read as meaning that 
NEPA contains a directive, which it clearly does not, indicating 
to the government what projects to plan or whether i t  need plan 
a t  all. 
c. NEPA section 101. As final support for its notion that 
NEPA requires privately imposed federal planning, the court 
states that the provisions of section 101 directing the federal gov- 
ernment "to use all practical means . . . to improve and coordi- 
nate Federal plans, functions, programs and resources" may be 
judicially enforced.g1 Thus, violation of such provisions "might 
justify a judicial directive to coordinate various major federal 
actions into one comprehensive . . . action, followed by a direc- 
tive ordering" a comprehensive impact statement for this court- 
organized action.92 The court concedes, however, that an agency 
would be in substantive violation of NEPA only if its failure to 
plan comprehensively was found to be arbitrary or c a p r i c i o u ~ . ~ ~  
In quoting section 101, the court omitted language that limits 
the scope of the section's possible interpretation: 
I n  order to carry out the policy set forth in  this chapter, i t  is the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considera- 
t ions of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal 
plans, functions, programs, and resources . . . . 94 
Both the syntax and the location of the language omitted by the 
court suggest an important consideration: an agency is not au- 
thorized by the Act to ignore other expressions of national policy, 
nor is a court justified in enforcing NEPA's provisions in a way 
that would violate such policy. Yet in its interpretation and en- 
forcement of section 101 in the instant case, the court appears to 
have disregarded a fundamental national policy: executive agen- 
cies are to be permitted to exercise discretion in the organization 
and implementation of their own programs. Absent a clear statu- 
tory provision requiring planning, and to that extent eliminating 
- - -- - -- 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(D) (1970). 
91. 514 F.2d at 874. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 875. 
94. 42 U.S.C. 4 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added). 
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agency discretion, the court's significant intrusion in the present 
case into discretionary agency decisions appears unjustifiable. 
Even if it were consistent with national policy to impose a 
planning requirement on an agency, the court itself concedes that 
"an agency could not be found to have failed to plan comprehen- 
sively in violation of NEPA unless that failure was so gross as to 
be arbitrary and capr ic io~s ."~~ In the instant case a t  least, such 
a determination seems unlikely. The Department of the Interior's 
good faith effort to implement NEPA is demonstrated by the 
short-term limited leasing program, the National Coal impact 
statement, and the subregional cumulative impact statement 
covering the Powder River Basin? 
2. Judicial us. congressional imposition of planning 
requirements 
Although the court's argument about the legality of privately 
imposed federal planning is weak, it cannot be denied that com- 
prehensive planning in the management of natural resources is 
the ideal. In response to congressional inquiries, the Department 
of the Interior candidly admitted that the major deficiency in the 
traditional coal leasing system has been the practice of awarding 
leases on demand without concern for environmental conse- 
quences." The intense current pressure placed on the Depart- 
ment of the Interior by the nation's demand for energy develop- 
ment may again result in the nearsighted exploitation that char- 
acterized the nation's nineteenth century expansion. Comprehen- 
sive planning would serve as a hedge against that type of near- 
sightedness and would prevent the establishment of energy devel- 
opment policy by default. The nation could thus avoid inefficient 
use of resources resulting from piecemeal decision -makingY 
Nevertheless, as desirable as federal planning may be, it is 
evident that Congress did not intend that NEPA require compre- 
hensive planning. Indeed, in the six years of NEPA's existence, 
no court has ever held, as the court in the instant case suggests, 
that NEPA requires comprehensive planning. Rather, all other 
- - 
95. 514 F.2d at 874 n.25. 
96. See notes 11-12, 14-16 and accompanying text supra. Judge Wright acknowledged 
the Department of the Interior's good faith in establishing its interim policy, but expressed 
concern that there remained potential for irretrievable commitment of resources without 
proper environmental consideration. 514 F.2d at 883. 
97. Brief for Appellants at 49, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
98. S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). 
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courts, when confronted with demands that they require the gov- 
ernment to comprehensively plan, have taken the position ex- 
pressed by the district court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Armstr~ng:~~ "Plaintiffs' suggestion that there is a need for 
comprehensive study . . . should be made to the Congress, and 
not to the court."loo In light of the fact that no statutory authority 
exists for mandatory planning, any other position would reflect, 
as does the position of the court in the instant case, a callous 
disregard of the proper limits of judicial power. 
99. 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
100. Id. at 139. 
